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1. Introduction. 
 
During the 1990s we moved rapidly up the international living standards league 
tables, to the point where, by some measures, we were among the world leaders at the 
start of the new millennium.  An exceptional feature of this boom was the rate of 
growth of the numbers employed and the fall in the unemployment rate. Having 
stagnated for over sixty years, the numbers at work grew at an annual average rate of 
over three per cent in the 1990s. Employment growth significantly outpaced 
population growth, so that GNP per person rose much faster than GNP per person at 
work or productivity.
1  By the start of the new millennium, the unemployment rate 
had fallen below 4 per cent and all the indicators showed that full employment had 
been attained.   
 
Even though the period of exceptional growth ended three years ago, the “day of 
reckoning” that was widely feared during the later phases of the boom has not 
arrived. There were many warnings that a world recession – especially in the high–
tech industries on which we were possibly over-dependent – would have dire 
repercussions on Ireland. However, Ireland has weathered the slowdown in the 
growth in the industrialised economies storm surprisingly well. Our GNP growth rate 
fell from 10.2 per cent in 2000 to virtually zero in 2003 but employment did not 
collapse and the rise in the unemployment rate has been modest.  We are  one of the 
few OECD countries – Austria, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the US 
are the others - whose unemployment rate is now at or below the level recorded in the 
1960s.
2   
 
That the Irish economy should have done so well in the 1990s was surprising, but that 
much of this out-performance should have been due to the exceptional performance 
of the labour market was remarkable in view of our failure in the past to generate 
employment opportunities for the potential growth of the labour force.   
 
No one predicted the explosive growth of the 1990s, although after the fact some 
commentators interpreted it as a belated and long-overdue convergence on our richer 
neighbours.  The Economic and Social Research Institute’s Medium Term Reviews 
sounded an optimistic note from 1994 onwards, drawing attention to Ireland’s out-
performance of the EU economy before this was widely acknowledged, but their 
forecasts proved conservative.  In 1994 they anticipated that GNP growth would 
average 4.5 per cent for the rest of the decade; in 1997 they raised this to just over 5 
per cent for the period 1995-2004.  All of these forecasts were lower than the 
outcome.
3  Their forecasts of the fall in the unemployment rate proved equally 
conservative, as may be seen from Figure 1.  
                                                 
1In fact, in terms of productivity growth the 1990s were less impressive than the 1960s. See Table 1, 
below, and Honohan and Walsh, 2002, and Cassidy, 2004.    
2 In fact, Ireland is the only OECD whose unemployment is now significantly lower than it was in the 
1960s.  See Nickell, 2004, for a discussion of these trends. 
3 Even as late as 1997 a predicted growth rate of over 8 per cent for the rest of the decade would have 
lacked credibility. The ESRI authors drew attention to the fact that since 1986 they had nearly always 
erred on the side of pessimism “though this has not stopped commentators as viewing the ESRI as 
inveterate optimists” (ESRI, 1997, p. 34)!   3
Figure 1 
 
Academic studies of the Irish unemployment problem and estimates of the 
equilibrium or Non-Accelerating Inflation Unemployment Rate (NAIRU) were even 
more conservative.  The consensus was that the bulk of the very high unemployment 
recorded in the 1980s and early 1990s was “structural” and would not be alleviated by 
a cyclical recovery.   For example, a comparative study of  the OECD countries 
concluded that the equilibrium or natural unemployment rate in Ireland had risen 
from 9 per cent over the period 1969-79 to 13 per cent in the 1980s (Layard, Nickell, 
and Jackman, 1991, p. 436).  Another estimate, published long after the boom got 
underway, suggested that although Ireland’s NAIRU had fallen from a peak of 14 per 
cent in 1990, it was still over 9 per cent in 1999 (McMorrow and Roeger, 2000, 
Tables 1 and 2). Pessimism about the labour market was reinforced by the fact that 
during the earlier phases of the boom employment seemed slow to respond to the 
growth of GNP and the unemployment rate remained stubbornly high.  I entitled an 
article on the Irish labour market published in 1999 “The Persistence of High 
Unemployment” (Walsh, 1999a). 
 
In this address I look first at some features of the behaviour of the labour market 
during the boom. Then I explore why employment grew so rapidly and the 
unemployment rate fell so fast and what changes in labour market structures and 
institutions might account for the sharp fall in the “equilibrium” unemployment rate.  
 
This topic is worthy of attention in light of the frequent, by now almost ritualistic, 
declarations that the key to improving the performance of the economies of 
continental Europe lies in reform of their labour markets. The forces behind Ireland’s 
success should have lessons for other countries faced with the problem of stubbornly 





2.1 The transformation – the broad picture. 
  
Table 1 shows growth rates of GNP
5, employment, and population, and the ratio of 
non-agricultural employment to the total population over three sub-periods, 1961-
1973, 1973-1988, and 1988-2003.
6  While the definition of the last period joins a 
trough to a near-peak, and a small proportion of the recorded employment growth 
reflects changes in survey methodology,
7 there is no doubting that over the past 
Table 1  
                                                 
4 For an extended account of Ireland’s economic fortunes since the 1960s, on which this section draws, 
see Honohan and Walsh, 2002.  My interpretation of labour market developments also draws on Walsh 
(2002). 
5 I use GNP as the better measure than GDP of trends in the size of the Irish economy and, especially, 
in living standards. 
6 Any choice of sub-periods is somewhat arbitrary.   These correspond approximately to a period of 
sustained if unspectacular growth, the period of the oil crisis and the fiscal adjustment of the 1980s, 
and the prolonged recovery and boom of the 1990s.  
7 The employment data are derived from the ILO definitions of the labour force in the results of the 
Labour Force Survey and its successor the Quarterly National Household Survey. The QNHS replaced 
the annual LFS in the fourth quarter of 1997 and the change in methodology between the two surveys 
is believed to added some 20,000 to measured employment, comparing 1998 with 1997.    4
fifteen years the Irish economy generated jobs at a world-record-breaking pace. This 
was all the more impressive and unexpected in light of our historical record as a 
labour-surplus economy where the unemployment rate was held in check only by 
emigration, low labour force participation rates, and a continued reliance on 
subsistence farming.  
 
In the 1990s, the ratio of the numbers at work outside agriculture to the total 
population has risen sharply (Figure 2).  This made an important contribution to the 
sudden and rapid rise in Irish living standards.  Figure 3 shows the net flows into key 
demographic categories over our three sub-periods, which help us understand the 
dynamics of the rise in the employment/population ratio.  During the the1960s and 
early 1970s non-agricultural employment increased but so too did unemployment and 
the young dependent population.  Things were worse during the 1980s, as the 
numbers of unemployed and economically inactive adults rose while the level of non-
agricultural employment fell.  Only the decline in the number of young dependents 
mitigated these negative trends.  In the 1990s, however, apart from a small increase in 
the population aged over 64, all the dependent categories – those aged under 14, 
inactive adults, and the unemployed - shrank, while non-agricultural employment 
grew at an unprecedented rate.   
Figures 
2 and 3  
 
We had no reason to expect such a sudden and dramatic improvement in 1990s.  
True, the rising birth rate of the 1970s implied that if the country were to “solve its 
unemployment problem” exceptionally rapid growth in employment would be 
required.  Population and employment projections revealed job-creation requirements 
that far outstripped any previous employment growth and generated profound 
pessimism.  The question of where so many jobs would come from seemed 
unanswerable, unless the public sector were to act as an employer of last resort, with 
unsustainable fiscal implications.  The hope generated by the boom of the late 1970s 
was short-lived and more than dissipated in the protracted recession that followed, 
during which Ireland’s labour market was one of the worst performing in Europe.   
The unemployment rate rose from 7 per cent in 1979 to 17 per cent in 1986.  The 
increasing proportion of the unemployed who had been out of work for a year or 
more pointed to hysteresis and the possibility that the equilibrium unemployment rate 
was drifting up in tandem with the actual rate.  The already-low labour force 
participation rate fell further and by the end of the decade renewed emigration led to a 
decline in the population of active age while the numbers of young and old 
dependents continued to grow.   
 
The picture changed dramatically during the 1990s.  As the rate of growth of output 
recovered, the labour market situation improved, slowly at first but then more rapidly. 
Between the trough in 1986-87 and 2003 total employment grew by 60 per cent, non-
agricultural employment by 80 per cent, and private sector employment even faster.  
The unemployment fell sharply and net emigration was replaced by immigration in 
the second half of the 1990s (Figures 4 and 5).  The labour market moved from a 
situation of significant excess supply as late as 1993 to one where excess demand was 
the problem. Ireland’s success over this period compares favourably with what has 
been labelled the US “employment miracle” (Krueger and Pischke, 1997).    
Figures 4 
and 5  
   5
 
2.2 Some details  
 
In this section I look in more detail at how the labour market was transformed in the 
1990s. 
 
As I have noted, one of the worst features of the high rate of unemployment in the 
mid-1980s was the preponderance of long-term unemployed in the total – a feature 
that led to the belief that much of the problem was “structural” and would not respond 
to an increase in the demand for labour.  Even on optimistic assumptions about the 
growth of output and employment, in 1994 high levels of long-term unemployment 
were regarded as “virtually unavoidable” and its level was expected to increase over 
the rest of the decade.
8   But in fact the long-term unemployment rate fell from 9 per 
cent in 1994 to 1.2 per cent in 2001, even more rapidly than the short-term 
unemployment  (Figure 6).  And by 2001 the short-term unemployment rate – often 
taken as a better indicator of the supply/demand balance in the labour market than the 
overall unemployment rate – had fallen to 2.5 per cent.  This compares favourable 
with the United States, where there is virtually no long-term unemployment, and an 
overall unemployment rate of about 5 per cent is often taken to represent “full 
employment”.   
Figure 6  
 
During the early 1990s it was believed that the official unemployment rate – based on 
the ILO criterion of active job search – excluded many “discouraged workers” who 
had given up looking for work because they saw no point in searching for what 
wasn’t there.  Since the late 1980s a more comprehensive indicator of labour market 
slack has been available.  This treats as unemployed those who express any interest 
in, or passive search for, employment.  Figure 7 shows the “discouraged worker rate”, 
measured as the difference between the unemployment rate defined to include all 
those marginally attached to the labour force and the conventionally-defined rate. 
This rate fell from 7 per cent of the (broadly defined) labour force in 1993 to 4 per 
cent in 2001.
9   
Figure 7 
 
The fall in the unemployment rate and rise in the participation rate led to a sharp fall 
in the proportion of households where no one was working.  The proportion of 
households where there was at least one economically active person - employed or 
unemployed – and no-one employed fell from 12.6 per cent in 1988, to 9.0 per cent in 
1997, to 4.3 per cent in 2001.  Not surprisingly, over the same period there was an 
increase in the proportion of “work-rich” house, that is, with two or more employed 
members – from 29 to 50 per cent of all households.  
 
In most OECD countries, part-time contracts have contributed more than half of all 
recent employment growth.  The extreme example has been the Netherlands, where 
women working part-time in the service sector accounted for over half the total 
increase in employment between 1983 and 1997 (Garibaldi and Mauro, 2002).  In 
contrast, the Irish employment boom was biased towards full-time jobs.  If we 
Table 2 
                                                 
8 O’Connell and Sexton, 1994, p. 27. 
9 The erraticness of this series in 1997-98 may reflect the change-over to the QNHS.   6
allocate the total increase in employment – almost 700 thousand jobs – between men 
and women, full-time and part-time, we see that full-time jobs accounted for over two 
thirds of this total (Table 2).  While the share of part-time working among women 
rose from 16.5 to 30.4 per cent, the proportion of these declaring themselves 
“underemployed” was only 0.7 per cent.  The number of men working full-time 
increased by one third, which is very striking in view of the substantial decline in 
male employment in most industrialised economies over this period.    
 
I now briefly discuss the development of unemployment rates by (i) age group, (ii) 
education level, and (iii) region of the country.  We shall see that on all of these 
dimensions the fall in unemployment was fairly evenly shared across sub-groups.    
 
Age-specific employment and unemployment rates are displayed in Figure 8.  The 
absolute differentials in unemployment rates between the labour market entry and 
“prime-age” groups fell sharply as the overall rate declined, although the ratio of the 
age-specific rates remained fairly stable.  Despite the continuing upward trend in 
education participation rates, employment rates in the 15-24 year age group rose.  The 
marked increase in employment rates among women aged 25-44 was one of the 
salient features of the boom, and a fairly widespread phenomenon, but the rise in 
employment rates for both men and women in the older group was unusual by 
European standards. 
Figure 8  
 
Figure 9 shows employment and unemployment rates classified by educational 
attainment.
10  The fall in unemployment rates was marked at all educational levels – 
especially among men.  But while the absolute differentials between the education 
groups fell, the ratio of the rates remained fairly stable.  In 2001 the unemployment 
rate among males with only primary education was still more than five times that 
among those with third level education. However, the unemployment rate among 
males with Leaving and Junior Certificate education did fall in relative terms, as well 
as absolutely.   
Figure 9 
 
The fall in the overall unemployment rate reflects both the reduction in age- and 
education-specific rates and the shift in the structure of the labour force towards 
demographic groups with lower unemployment rates.  (The share of the labour force 
accounted for by those with only Primary education fell from 25 per cent to 10 per 
cent.)  To allocate the actual decline between these sources, I constructed an 
“education-standardised” unemployment rate, based on the actual 1988 
unemployment rates in each educational group and the 2001 shares of these groups in 
the labour force, which yields a rate of 12.9 per cent.  As the actual unemployment 
rate declined from 16.7 per cent in 1988 to 6.4 per cent in 2001, 37 per cent of the 
observed decline might be attributed to the changing education composition of the 
labour force, and over 63 per cent to the decline in unemployment rates within 
groups.  But this calculation overestimates the contribution of the higher educational 
attainment to the fall in the unemployment rate because the educational structural of 
the labour force is endogenous.  Had the labour market situation remained as 
                                                 
10 These are based on Principal Economic Status rather than ILO definitions.  I am grateful to John 
FitzGerald for providing me with the relevant LFS data.   7
depressed as it had been in the late 1980s, the “brain drain” would have accelerated 
and the average educational attainment of the labour force would have risen less.  
 
The trends in employment rates by educational level were mixed.  Among males only 
small changes were recorded within each educational category, showing that the rise 
in the overall male employment rate was mainly due to the increasing share of groups 
with high employment rates rather than to the rise in rates within each category.  On 
the other hand, there were large increases in female employment rates within each 
educational category, which added to the effect of the increased shares of the better-
educated groups in the labour force to produce a very large increase in the overall 
female employment rate.  
 
Figure 10  Using the regional groupings adopted in 1995, Figure 10 shows the evolution of 
regional unemployment and employment rates during the boom. The unemployment 
rate fell, and the employment rate rose, in all regions.  The fall in Dublin’s 
unemployment rate is welcome in view of its disadvantaged position at the start of the 
period. The absolute dispersion in employment and unemployment rates between the 
regions fell markedly, but the relative dispersion increased somewhat.
11  I have 
argued elsewhere that these differentials are not evidence of a regional “problem” but 
may be plausibly attributed to the different structural characteristics of the regions 
such as their size and the density of their labour force (Walsh, 1999b).   Although the 
evolution of the regional distribution of economic activity during the boom may have 
been sub-optimal from several points of view, there is no compelling evidence of 
increasing regional imbalances in labour market supply-demand balances.   
 
2.3 Where did all the jobs come from? 
 
As already mentioned, it was difficult during the dark days of the 1980s to see where 
employment growth on the scale needed to make a dent in Ireland’s labour surplus 
would come from.  With the benefit of hindsight, some interesting features of the 
employment boom may be noted.   
 
First of all, the numbers of at work grew mainly because of the expansion in the 
numbers working in “real jobs”, that is employment in the open labour market, not 
dependent on subsidies or taxpayer’s support. To a lesser extent, pressure on the 
labour market was alleviated by an expansion of special employment schemes and 
social welfare measures designed to reduce long-term unemployment.  
 
2.3.1 The growth in “real jobs”. 
 
Not all sectors of the economy offered increased employment opportunities during 
the boom (Figure 11).  Employment in agriculture continued its secular decline.  
Employment in the traditional industrial sectors – clothing, textiles, furniture, and so 
on - was more or less static over the entire period and declined in recent years.   In the  Figure 11 
                                                 
11 The coefficient of variation of regional unemployment rates rose from 12.3 to 17.6 per cent and of 
employment rates from 3.4 to 5.3 per cent.  
     8
early years of the boom, employment in the public sector and in tax-financed public 
services was held in check. 
 
Strong employment growth in export-driven manufacturing was a particular feature of 
the boom.  This went against the trend of the OECD countries generally, where 
industrial employment declined.  Most of the Irish expansion occurred in newer 
sectors such as electronics, pharmaceuticals, and medical instrumentation where 
foreign-owned firms account for over 90 per cent of output.  However, these sectors 
were badly affected by the slowdown after 2001, leading to an overall decline in 
manufacturing jobs. From the peak of 2001, employment has now declined by 9 per 
cent, with employment in “Optical and Electrical Equipment” declining by over a 
quarter.  At the end of 2003 manufacturing as a whole accounted for only 16 per cent 
of total employment, compared with almost 20 per cent in the mid-1980s.    
 
Employment in construction has more than doubled since the early 1990s, increasing 
at the fastest rate of any sector.  It now accounts for 11 per cent of all employment, 
compared with only 7 per cent in the mid-1980s.  The expansion reflects a catching-
up phase in residential and office accommodation and must be expected to go into 
reverse over the medium term.  
 
The predominance of “market services” as a provider of new jobs is striking.  This 
heterogeneous category ranges from financial services (banks, insurance companies, 
etc), legal services, accountancy firms, to hotels, catering, restaurants, pubs, and so 
on.  It includes employment in what might be regarded as ‘economic base’ activities 
(such as tourism and internationally traded financial services) as well as ‘induced’ 
activities (such as local commercial services).  Employment in the publicly financed 
health and educational services has also increased quite rapidly, especially in recent 
years, but the numbers in core public administration have been contained.   
 
There is little prospect of further employment growth in manufacturing or 
construction over the medium term, so in the future employment is likely to be even 
more concentrated in the services sector of the economy.  
 
2.3.2  Special Employment Schemes and Related Measures 
 
Although public sector employment was held in check during the 1990s, special 
employment schemes financed from tax revenue and designed to provide work for the 
long-term unemployed and other hard-to-employ categories played a role in reducing 
unemployment.  The numbers employed on the largest of these schemes – the 
Community Employment Scheme - rose from about 1 per cent of the labour force in 
the late 1980s to a peak of 2.8 per cent in 1995, falling back to 2 per cent by 2001 and 
only 1.5 per cent at present.
12  It has been estimated that about half of those leaving 
these schemes return to unemployment, so they may be credited with taking about 
one percentage point off the total unemployment rate, although because many 
participants churn through the system, interrupting spells of unemployment with 
                                                 
12 These figures are from special tabulations of the QNHS furnished by the Central Statistics Office. 
They refer to those reported as employed on “government schemes” at the time of the Survey.  The 
flow through the schemes in the course of a year is higher. Many of the supported jobs are part-time.   9
spells on schemes, the impact on the long-term unemployment rate has been greater 
(O’Connell, 2000).  Nonetheless, the low short-term unemployment rate suggests that 
the displacement from long-term to short-term unemployment has not been 
significant.  However, because so few participants in these schemes move on to 
regular paid employment, they have increasingly been viewed as part of the problem 
of structural adjustment rather than part of the solution.  With the economy close to 
full employment, the rationale for large-scale schemes to provide work for the hard-
to-employ is questionable.  The provision for these schemes was reduced 
substantially in both 2003 and 2004.  To date there is no evidence that this has 
adversely affected labour market indicators. 
 
The social welfare system was used to encourage some of the unemployed to 
reclassify as retired or disabled.  During the 1980s new inducements were put in place 
to encourage the older unemployed to change their unemployment allowance into a 
“pre-retirement allowance” on condition that they withdraw from the labour force.  
The numbers on this scheme reached 15,000 (about one per cent of the labour force) 
in the early 1990s but fell to less than 12,000 in 2001.  The labour force participation 
rate among men aged 60-64 – the principal category likely to be affected by these 
measures – dropped from 61 per cent in 1988 to 55 per cent in 2003 but remains high 
by EU standards. Some of the reduction may be attributed to changes in the social 
welfare code, but other factors, such as improved private sector pension provision and 
the declining number of farmers, have contributed to earlier retirement.   
  
2.4 The fall in “equilibrium” unemployment. 
 
From the perspective of the elusive concept of the “equilibrium” unemployment rate, 
it is crucial to relate the trend in unemployment to wage and price developments.  The 
economy enjoyed a very favourable constellation of demand side shocks in the late 
1990s, as real interest and exchange rates fell and the world economy boomed.  These 
developments would have been expected to push the unemployment rate to a cyclical 
low, but if the labour market had not changed radically there would have been a 
marked build-up of inflationary wage and prices pressures.  (This is the argument 
used by European policy makers today when they claim that fiscal and monetary 
expansion would not be appropriate remedies for the continent’s unemployment 
problem.)  In Ireland, however, the trade-off between inflation and unemployment 
improved dramatically and the Phillips Curve shifted steadily leftward during the 
1990s.  Figure 12 compares shows the situation in 1981-1986 and in 1999-2003.  
While factors like the global subsidence of inflation and the change in the Irish 
exchange rate regime are the main reasons for the inward movement of the Phillips 
Curve, it is hard to believe that we could have achieve an unemployment rate below 4 
per cent without an explosion of wage inflation had the labour market remained 
unreformed.  Moreover, analysis suggests that the surge in inflation following our 
entry into the European Monetary Union was more closely linked with exchange rate 
developments than with labour market conditions (Lane and Honohan, 2003), a view 
supported by the speed with which it has subsided over the last twelve months even 
though the unemployment rate remained well below what would have been identified 
as the NAIRU just a few years earlier.  This calls to mind Robert Solow’s remark that 
Figure 12 
   10
A natural rate that hops around from one triennium to another under 
the influences of unspecified forces, including past unemployment 
rates, is not natural at all. (Solow, 1986) 
 
However, it is perhaps possible to shed light on these forces, a task to which I turn.  
 
3.  Understanding the transformation.   
 
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to analyse in detail the reasons for 
Ireland’s exceptional economic performance in the 1990s.  My focus is narrower, on 
the success story of the Irish labour market.  In trying to establish the factors that 
account for the fall in the Irish unemployment rate in the late 1990s, I am conscious 
of the limits to how much light can be shed on how labour markets in general 
function by looking at the experience of one country in isolation.  More robust 
inferences require a comparative perspective (see Nickell, 2004, and the studies cited 
there).   
 
My interpretation is basically that during the 1990s the Irish economy experienced a 
series of favourable demand-side shocks, emanating from exchange rate and interest 
rate developments, the global economic boom, and increased mobility of FDI and its 
increased sensitivity to tax differentials.
13  The dramatic response to these 
developments was facilitated by a set of favourable supply side developments – an 
elastic labour supply underpinned by a strong demographic situation, the growing 
stock of human capital due to rising levels of education attainment in the inflow to the 
labour force, wage moderation induced by centralised wage bargaining and declining 
union power, a reduction in the tax wedge on earnings, a fall in the unemployment 
replacement ratio, and a stricter approach to unemployment benefit claimants.  
 
The juxtaposition of so many favourable demand and supply side developments 
makes the economic “miracle” relatively understandable! 
 
3.1 Demographic forces. 
 
At the height of the economic crisis of the 1980s it was not uncommon to blame the 
inexorable rise in Irish unemployment partly on “our young and rapidly growing 
labour force”.  It was claimed that the unemployment rate would have been much 
lower had the rate of natural increase of the labour force been zero rather than about 
two percent a year.  However, demographic pressures contribute little to 
understanding the variations in unemployment rates across Europe – high 
unemployment persists in continental economies where demographic pressures have 
for long been absent – and it is apparent that the dramatic fall in Ireland’s 
unemployment rate during the 1990s was not a reflection of reduced demographic 
pressure.  Ironically, as the economy recovered it became popular to include our 
healthy demographic structure among the explanations of the employment boom – the 
young and rapidly growing labour force was no longer was seen as part of the 
problem, but part of the solution! The lesson to be learned is that under favourable 
                                                 
13 On this last point see Hines, 2003.   11
macroeconomic conditions, a well-functioning labour market can absorb a rapidly 
growing labour force into employment.  Portugal in the 1970s and Israel in the 1990s, 
for example, absorbed large and sudden increases in their population into 
employment and the United States, with its rapidly growing labour force, has 
maintained a relatively low unemployment rate.  Ireland in the 1990s can be added to 
this list of examples of favourable labour market outcomes.  
 
3.2 Economic Growth, Employment, and Unemployment. 
 
The growth of employment and fall in unemployment were part cause and part effect 
of the exceptional rate of economic growth recorded in the 1990s.  However, let us 
pose the question: making no allowance for reverse causation, treating the rate of 
growth of output as exogenous to the labour market, does it account for the growth of 
employment and the fall in the unemployment rate?  The short answer is yes – the 
link between the growth of output and the growth of employment, and the growth of 
output and employment and the fall in unemployment seems to have been stable, 
comparing the 1990s with earlier periods.  On the basis of past experience, the 
exceptional growth spurt after 1993 would have been expected to transform the 
labour market situation in the manner that was recorded.  
 
I summarise the link between these variables by regressing the rate of change in non-
agricultural employment (Y) on the GNP growth rate (X) – plus a dummy D to allow 
for the impact of the change in definitions in 1998.  This yields the following result 
for the period 1961-2003 (t-ratios in parentheses): 
 
Y  =  -2.30 + 0.46 X  + 0.19 X-1 + 0.32 X - 2  + 3.76 D     R
2 = 0.80    D. W. = 1.32       
         (5.3)    (5.9)        (2.1)          (3.9)           (3.2) 
 
There appear to be significant lags in the transmission of GNP growth to 
employment, as was apparent in the first half of the 1990s.
14 But of most interest to 
the theme of present paper is that there was no break in this relationship in the 1990s.  
While this was bad news from the perspective of the growth of productivity and 
living standards, it was good for the impact of output growth on employment.  
 
A second simple check on the links between economic growth and the labour market 
is Okun’s Law, which has proved reliable over the decades in tracking the links the 
growth of output and changes in the unemployment rate.  Regressing the change in 
the unemployment rate (Y) on the GNP growth rate (X) yields the following result for 
the period 1961-2003: 
 
Y  =  1.77  -  0.28 X  -  0.11 X-1         R
2 = 0.57    D. W. = 1.71      
       (6.3)    (4.8)         (2.1)        
 
or using a two–year moving average of the GNP growth rate: 
                                                 
14 The differences between the coefficients on GNP growth rate and its lags are not statistically 
significant.  Using a three-year moving average of the GNP growth rate, the following result is 
obtained:   Y  = -2.2  + 0.95 X   + 3.6 D    R
2 = 0.79   D. W.  = 1.22 
                           (5.1)   (10.6)       (3.1)    12
 
Y  =   1.84  -  0.41 X          R
2 = 0.56    D. W. = 1.78      
         (6.3)    (7.2)          
 
This implies that a GNP growth rate of about 4.5 per cent is needed in the long run to 
prevent the unemployment rate from rising.  Of course, this would be expected to fall 
as the rate of natural increase of the labour force slows.  Figure 13 displays the 
traditional Okun graph.  The statistical results reveal no significant break in the 
relationship in the late 1990s. The largest single decrease in the unemployment rate 
(2.8 percentage points) was recorded in 1998 – the year after the change in 
methodology – but a dummy variable for this year is not highly significant, although 
it has the expected negative sign.  On the other hand, the largest single increase in the 
unemployment rate was recorded in 1981 - 2.6 percentage points.  It might be inferred 
that it is harder to explain why unemployment rose so rapidly in the early 1980s than 
why it fell so fast in the late 1990s! 
Figure 13 
 
We can think of the Okun approach as implying that GNP growth generates 
employment growth and employment growth reduces the unemployment rate.  The 
last step in this analysis is summarised by the following results, where Y is the change 
in the unemployment rate and X the rate of growth of employment (lags and the 1998 
Dummy were not significant): 
 
Y  =   0.90  -  0.42 X          R
2 = 0.64   D. W. = 1.36      
         (5.6)    (8.5)           
 
The result suggests that on average over the entire 40-year period employment growth 
of about 2 per cent was needed to stabilise the unemployment rate.
15  Of greatest 
relevance to the theme of the present paper, once again, is the finding that there 
appears to be no structural break in this relationship in the 1990s.   
 
Viewed in the context of the longer-run performance of the Irish economy, given the 
growth rate of GNP in the 1990s, the increase in employment was not exceptional, 
and given the growth of employment, fall in unemployment rate was not exceptional.  
According to this view, the dramatic fall in the Irish unemployment rate in the 1990s 
was “simply” a reflection of the economy’s exceptional growth rate.  None the less, 
although these regressions are highly significant, the R
2 leave plenty of room for 
excluded variables factors to have played significant roles, even if many of these are 
difficult to model econometrically. 
 
3.3  Wage Moderation and Centralised Wage Bargaining. 
 
Traditionally, overt unemployment in Ireland was kept in check by the operation of 
the safety value of emigration, and since the Second World War this was 
predominantly to the United Kingdom.  Any incipient widening of the Irish-UK 
unemployment rate differential was quickly closed by higher outflows.  This ensured 
that the Irish unemployment rate was typically only three or four percentage points 
Figure 14  
                                                 
15 However, this does not control for the rate of net migration, which was in the past an important 
mechanism for stabilising unemployment in Ireland.     13
above the UK rate average for most of the 1960s and into the 1970s.  It can be seen 
from Figure 14 that the two rates were closely linked and indeed cointegration 
analysis confirms this (Honohan and Walsh, 2002).   However, it is also evident that 
the historic relationship between Irish and UK unemployment rates broke down in the 
1980s, most likely due to the collapse in the demand for unskilled workers in 
construction and manufacturing in the UK.  In the second half of the decade the gap 
between the Irish and UK unemployment rates reached an unprecedented six 
percentage points.  The closure of the traditional safety value of emigration was 
initially a severe adverse shock to the Irish economy, but I shall argue below that its 
longer-run repercussions on wage bargaining and domestic employment growth were 
benign.  As recovery got underway in Britain during the Lawson boom, it was to be 
expected that a pent-up tide of Irish emigrants would flow out.  And in fact the initial 
easing of the Irish labour market situation in the late 1980s came from renewed 
emigration to the UK and US.  However, the rapid fall in unemployment in the late 
1990s and the narrowing of the Irish-UK unemployment gap was due to the domestic 
employment boom rather than to the traditional mechanism of heavy emigration.  
 
My interpretation of the transformation of the Irish labour market during the late 
1980s and 1990s is that the widening of the Irish-UK unemployment differential and 
the unprecedented rise in the Irish unemployment rate brought about a painful internal 
adjustment and eventually led to a moderation of nominal wage inflation, mediated 
through a return to centralised wage bargaining.  When measured in a common 
currency, the moderation of the rate of growth in nominal wages relative to our main 
competitors was further helped – somewhat fortuitously - by the devaluations of 1986 
and 1993, and the low level at which the Irish pound entered the European Monetary 
Union. Wage moderation was reinforced by tax cuts that allowed take-home pay to 
rise faster than labour costs, and sustained into the 1990s by a very elastic labour 
supply as reservoirs of under-utilized work effort were drawn into employment.  
 
An elastic labour supply was not a new phenomenon in Ireland, but in earlier periods 
it had not led to wage moderation.  For example, in the first half of the 1980s, despite 
the rising unemployment rate, wage rates rose relative to our trading partners, and 
Ireland’s competitive position deteriorated.  The trend was, however, sharply reversed 
after 1986.  Figure 15 shows relative hourly earnings
16 in a common currency and in 
national currencies relative to a weighted average of our trading partners.  Both series 
were rising (that is, showing a loss of competitiveness) until 1986 but this adverse 
trend was reversed over the period 1986-1997 in national currencies and for a further 
three years in a common currency.  The dips in the common currency series after 
1992 and 1997 reveal how devaluations boosted competitiveness, at least temporarily. 
In Honohan and Walsh, 2002, we showed that deviations of the competitiveness 
index from its trend are closely associated with the trend in employment.    
Figure 15  
 
In addition to exchange rate movements, the key factor to be considered in relation to 
the behaviour of the competitiveness series is the role of centralized wage bargaining 
or “social partnership” after 1987.  The unprecedented unemployment rate – 
                                                 
16 That is, average hourly earnings, not including employer’s taxes and social charges.  Note that this 
series does not include any adjustment for productivity, which is strongly influenced by sectoral shifts 
and the growth of the entrepôt industrial sectors.   14
attributable not only to the economy’s poor performance but also to the exogenous 
shock of high British unemployment – created a consensus that generalized belt-
tightening was needed. The result was a National Wage Agreement followed by four 
others, negotiated over successive 3-4 year horizons extending from 1988 to 2003, 
designed to deliver industrial peace and moderate rates of wage inflation in exchange 
for reductions in the burden of direct taxation and an increasingly ambitious agenda 
of social and economic changes.   
 
Admirers of the partnership approach claim that it deserves much of the credit for the 
exceptional growth in employment in the 1990s.  True, the strike rate fell to a much 
lower level after the new wage bargaining system was launched and by the end of the 
decade had ceased to be a general problem.  However, real wages continued to rise – 
there was no significant break in trend in the late 1980s,although there was a pause in 
the mid-1990s (Figure 16).   Indeed, once the influence of exchange rate fluctuations 
are allowed for, it is hard to identify a statistically significant role for the domestic 
unemployment rate, much less the pay bargaining regime, in the behaviour of the 
wage series (Curtis and FitzGerald, 1996; Walsh, 2000). Nonetheless, despite the 
inconclusive econometric results, most observers regard the coincidence of the 
reversal of the deteriorating trend in competitiveness with the new approach to pay 
bargaining as suggestive that it did pay dividends, if only by facilitating reductions in 
taxes on wage earners and the backward shifting of this to employers.
17  
Figure 16  
 
In summary, the combination of declining union density (see below) and the return to 
centralized wage bargaining may plausibly be regarded as factors that tended to offset 
the upward pressure on wages exerted by unions and to have contributed to the 
improved trend in Irish relative wage costs during the late 1980s and the first half of 
the 1990s. 
   
3.4 Structural  Labour  Market Reforms.  
 
In addition to the change in the wage bargaining system, there were several other 
structural changes in Irish labour market between the 1980s and the 1990s.  For the 
most part these were in the direction that economists identify as likely to contribute to 
a lower equilibrium unemployment rate by reducing labour market rigidities.  
Changes of this type are viewed as the key to reducing continental Europe’s high rate 
of unemployment
18 and indeed Nickell (2004) concludes they “enable us to 
understand why some European countries have been able fully to recover from the 
employment disasters of the early 1980s whereas some have not”.  It is hard to 
imagine more favourable circumstance for implementing such reforms than during 
the buoyant labour market conditions that prevailed in Ireland in the 1990s.    
 
I turn now to an examination of some salient changes in the structure of the Irish that 
would be expected to have lowered our equilibrium rate of unemployment. 
 
3.4.1 Union density. 
                                                 
17 We pointed out elsewhere that the correlation between overall share of taxation in GNP with the 
index of competitiveness is very high (Honohan and Walsh, 2002).   
18 See the OECD Jobs Study (1994) and the Jobs Strategy based on these studies.    15
 
The disastrous labour market trends of the 1980s had hit the Irish trade union 
movement very hard.  Union membership, which had been growing rapidly from the 
1960s, peaked in 1980 and then declined steadily.  Union density declined even more 
rapidly and did not recover, as most of the new jobs created in the booming economy 
were in union-free workplaces.  From a peak of over 60 per cent in the early 1980s, 
union membership as a percentage of the employed labour force fell to 44 per cent at 
the end of 1990s.  Although we do not have a public/private sector breakdown of 
these rates, it is likely that membership and density declined more rapidly in the 
private sector and has become increasingly concentrated in pubic sector 
employment.
19   
 
Arguably the role of unions was changed by the revival and deepening of a 
centralized bargaining process that went beyond wages to cover taxation and other 
aspects of economic policy.  A reduction in union power would be expected to ease 
upward pressure on wage rates and this, combined with greater co-ordination in the 
exercise of this power, would be expected to lower the equilibrium unemployment 
rate.   
 
3.4.2 A leaner, meaner social welfare system and a less punitive tax system 
 
The point of departure in Ireland in the 1980s was a social welfare system that was 
not unduly generous by continental European standards.  However, there were serious 
disincentives and anomalies, as well as a lax attitude towards eligibility for benefits 
and assistance, and some commentators cited these as reasons for the persistence of 
high unemployment.   
 
During the 1980s the view gained ground that allowing unemployment assistance to 
be collected more or less indefinitely without any evidence of active job search 
contributed to the excess numbers claiming to be unemployed on the Live Register 
(LR) relative to the ILO measure of unemployment obtained from the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS). By the mid-1990s this discrepancy had reached 50 per cent, the largest 
in any OECD country.  This prompted the Central Statistics Office in conjunction 
with the 1996 LFS to conduct a special study of the labour force status of persons on 
the LR (CSO, 1996).  A random sample of one percent of claimants was included in 
the LFS.  Over a quarter of the sample was not located as usual residents at the 
addresses given.  When the LFS questionnaire was administered to the remainder of 
the sample, only half were classified as ILO unemployed. The other half was divided 
equally between ILO employed and ILO inactive.  As a result of these findings, more 
stringent tests of the job search criterion were included in the Irish National 
Employment Action Plan (Department of Enterprise and Employment, 2002).  Since 
September 1998 all those under 25 who have been unemployed for six months are 
called for interview to assess their suitability for an existing vacancy or training.  This 
approach was subsequently extended to other age groups according to the schedule 
set out in Table 3.  In a review of the Plan the OECD noted that “a surprisingly high 
                                                 
19 In the 1990s, union density increased in Public Administration, and Professional Services and Health 
and Education, but fell Industry and Construction. These figures have been made available to me by 
Bill Roche and are taken from the UCD DUES Series.    16
share of [claimants] can be dealt with in this fashion: nearly half either failed to 
attend the interview or refused intervention, and 28 per cent were struck off the rolls . 
. .”  (OECD, 1999, p. 127).    
 
However, reductions in the numbers claiming unemployment benefits do not 
necessarily translate one-for-one into reductions in the numbers unemployed 
according to the ILO definition.  After all, many of those targeted by the “activation 
measures” were believed not to be unemployed in the ILO sense because they were 
not actively seeking employment. The ratio of LR to ILO unemployment peaked (at 
260 per cent) in 1999 and fell sharply in 2000 and 2001, although it remains very 
high among those aged 25 and over, especially women.
20 This suggests that the 
activation measures were effective in reducing the numbers claiming benefits that 
were not ILO unemployed.  
Table 3  
 
The dip in the long-term unemployment rate after 1998 might be taken as evidence 
that these measures had a significant impact (see Figure 6).  However, the growth in 
GNP in the late 1990s was so rapid that it on its own might account for this outcome, 
as is shown by the regression of the change in LTU (Y) on GNP growth (X) using 
data for the period 1989 - 2003:  
 
Y  =  0.005    -   0.19 X          R
2 = 0.52    D. W. = 2.7      
       (1.6)          (4.4)         
 
No structural break after 1997 is evident in this relationship.  Although these results 
are based on just eleven years data, they suggest the need for caution in attributing 
the fall in LTU to anything other than the exceptional growth spurt.  
 
Higher replacement ratios (that is, the unemployment benefits as a percentage of net 
income from employment) were blamed for about half the rise in the Irish structural 
unemployment rate between the 1970s and the mid-1990s (Scarpetta, 1996).  These 
ratios declined sharply during the 1990s. Using an average over four household types 
and income levels, the OECD reckons that the Irish replacement rate fell from 50 per 
cent in 1980-87 to 35 per cent in 1999 – by far the largest fall in the OECD area.  In 
several European economies this ratio increased during the 1990s (OECD, 2002; 
Nickel, 2004).  Thus falling replacement ratios may be included among the factors 
that contributed to Ireland’s success in lowering its unemployment rate.
21   
 
The tax wedge on labour, that is, the difference between employers’ cost of 
employing workers and employees’ take home after tax, social welfare deductions 
and consumption taxes, peaked in Ireland in the late 1980s and fell back during the 
1990s.  It is now among the lowest in the OECD countries (Nickell, 2004).  A 
narrower measure that excludes consumption taxes declined by 18.3 percentage 
points between 1996 and 2003 – by far the largest reduction recorded in the OECD, 
                                                 
20 For more details of the behaviour of this ratio by demographic group, see (Walsh, 2003). 
21 However, micro-econometric estimates suggest that the effect of the replacement rate on the 
duration of unemployment is small in Ireland compared with the impacts reported in the international 
literature (Layte and Callan, 2001).       17
moving Ireland towards the bottom of the league table.
22   This wedge – or least the 
part of it due to direct taxes on wages – is reflected in the social welfare replacement 
rate, but its impact is wider than this because higher taxes on labour not only 
contribute to higher unemployment but also to lower employment by moving 
employers back up their demand curve and individuals back up their supply curves in 
combinations that depend on the extent of shifting.  The marked fall in these wedges 
during the 1990s would therefore be expected to have contributed to Ireland’s 
exceptional rate of employment creation.   
 
During the 1990s changes in the income tax system increased the incentives to 
accepting paid employment. The marginal income tax rate (including social security 
charges) facing an unmarried industrial worker on average wages peaked at an 
amazing 68.5 per cent in 1984.  By 2002 this had fallen to 46 per cent – by no means 
“low” but less of an inducement to evasion and avoidance.  The marginal tax rates 
facing other categories of workers were initially lower and also declined, although 
less dramatically.  Many low-paid workers were completely removed from the 
income net by progressively raising the tax threshold, which for an unmarried worker 
reached half average industrial earnings in 2002.   At the same time, the introduction 
of “individualization” in the income tax code increased the returns to a second 
income earner in a household.   Certain benefits such as rent supplements are no 
longer withdrawn on taking up employment and child benefits have been increased 
and uncoupled from unemployment benefits.   
 
Several other changes in the Irish social welfare code during the 1990s would also be 
expected to reduce unemployment and increase willingness to accept job offers.  A 
“back to work allowance” was introduced in 1993.  This permitted the long-term 
unemployed to hold on to 75 percent of their social welfare payments in the first year 
of employment, 50 per cent in the second, and 25 per cent in the third, thereby 
reducing the effective tax rate on employment for the unemployed. At its peak in 
2000 there were 39,000 participants in this scheme, but by 2002 numbers had fallen 
to 25,000 and further reductions occurred in 2003. Evaluations have shown the 
scheme had an impact in terms of reducing the numbers registered as unemployed 
and switching them to employment, though it has proved difficult to estimate the 
extent of deadweight and displacement in these numbers.
23 Another form of in-work 
benefit - the Family Income Supplement - was introduced in the 1980s to raise the 
take-home pay of those on low earnings. This too reduced the disincentives for the 
unemployed to accept job offers.  
 
3.4.3  Active labour market policies.  
 
The tightening up of the social welfare system was accompanied by increased 
spending on “active labour market policies”.  Special employment schemes and other 
active labour market initiatives was introduced and spending on them reached 1½ per 
cent of GDP by the end of the decade.  As a percentage of the average industrial wage 
per person unemployed, Ireland’s spend on these policies rose from 14 per cent in 
                                                 
22 For these data see www.oecd.org/ctp/taxingwages 
23 This is based on evaluations commissioned by the Department of Social, Community and Family 
Affairs.   18
1985 to 29 per cent in 1997, when only the Netherlands and the Scandinavian 
countries spent more relative to the numbers unemployed (OECD, 2001, Table 1.5).  
The most costly measure is the Community Employment Scheme, whose scope and 
impact have been discussed above. Though there is some microeconometric evidence 
to suggest that the increased emphasis on back to work measures did help to improve 
the functioning of the labour market in the 1990s, its role should not be exaggerated 
(Martin, 2000).   This expenditure has come under close scrutiny recently and has 
been significantly reduced and rationalized, without any apparent adverse effect on 
the aggregate labour market indicators.  
   
3.4.5. Minimum wage legislation. 
 
Not all policy changes went in the direction of greater labour market flexibility.  The 
introduction of a statutory national minimum wage at about 55 per cent of average 
industrial earnings in 2000 was viewed apprehension by employers and some 
economists.  After all, high minimum wages have been identified as significant factor 
in the high rates of youth unemployment in France and other continental economies.  
However, although the minimum wage has recently been increased to keep pace with 
inflation its effects on employment levels seem to have been small (Nolan, O’Neill, 
and Williams, 2002).  The most likely explanation for this lies in the rapid increase in 
the absolute and relative earnings of less skilled workers, which has reduced the 
effective “bite” of the minimum wage.  
 
3.4.6 Summary on structural labour market reforms. 
 
Comparing the Irish labour market at the turn of the millennium with what it had 
been in the mid-1880s, it is clear that several structural changes had occurred that 
would be expected – on theoretical grounds and on the basis of international 
evidence - to reduce the equilibrium unemployment rate.  Union density declined and 
the wage bargaining system became more coordinated.  The tax and social welfare 
systems became considerably more work-friendly in a variety of ways, large and 
small.
24  While no single measure should be singled out as the magic bullet that 
accounts for the vastly improved performance of the labour market, and estimating 
the impact of individual changes with any precision is difficult, taken together these 
measures undoubtedly improved the functioning of the labour market and allowed us 
to enjoy an unemployment rate of less than 4 per cent without experiencing an 
explosion of wage inflation.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
During the 1990s the Irish economy grew at an exceptional rate.  A key feature of 
this rapid growth was the unprecedented employment boom. This reduced the 
unemployment rate, raised the participation rate, and reversed the outflow of 
population from the country.  The resultant increase in the employment rate played a 
                                                 
24 Other factors mentioned in the international literature – such as changes in the degree of employment 
protection – do not seem very relevant to the Irish story.   19
large part in Ireland’s belated, but very rapid, catch-up in living standards with the 
leading economies.   
 
In this paper the institutional and structural factors that contributed to the 
transformation of the Irish economy and labour market have been examined.   Once 
the Irish economy had recovered from the effects of the policy errors of the 1970s 
and the protracted recession of the 1980s, it responded strongly to several favourable 
external shocks.  A very elastic labour supply was converted into rapid employment 
growth through a reversal of the deteriorating trend in wage competitiveness.  
Favourable exchange rate developments played their part in this but pride of place is 
usually given to the modest nominal wage settlements negotiated under the central 
wage agreements reintroduced in 1987 and there is some evidence to support this 
view.   The unprecedented rise in the unemployment rate in the mid-1980s and the 
reduced strength of the trade union movement helped create a new sense of realism 
that prevailed in wage negotiations and in the return to “social partnership”.  These 
in turn were repercussions of the very high rate of unemployment in the UK and the 
lack of opportunities for Irish emigrants in the wake of the Thatcherite recession.  
Paradoxically, in view of their eventual impact on Irish wage bargaining, these 
developments could be regarded as a favourable external shocks. 
 
The exceptional performance of the Irish labour market during the 1990s was not 
triggered by radical structural reforms, but rather by a series of individually 
relatively small changes in the right direction.  Disincentives to accepting offers of 
paid employment at prevailing wages were reduced, the administration of the social 
welfare system made more rigorous, and a plethora of active labour market 
measures was launched.  While these were not sufficiently far-reaching or effective 
in themselves to account for much of the drop in the unemployment rate and even 
less of the spectacular rise in employment, they undoubtedly helped maintain the 
momentum towards lower unemployment created by favourable macroeconomic 
developments.  
 
The Irish example is important because it shows how an output boom, supported by 
sensible changes in labour market structures and policies, turned one of Europe’s 
worst performing labour markets into one of the best in less than a decade.   
Some of the forces behind the Irish success story could not be implemented by all 
countries simultaneously due their “beggar-my-neighbour” component.  For 
example, it is not possible for all countries to improve their competitiveness by 
simultaneous devaluations!  But a favourable environment for investment, a low tax 
burden, moderate growth in wage costs, a cooperative approach to industrial 
relations, a realistic approach to income maintenance for the unemployed, and 
incentives to help labour markets adjustments, are policies that played their role in 
reducing unemployment in Ireland and that other countries might with benefit 
emulate.  These policies do not simply redistribute a given level of economic 
activities between countries, they have the potential to increase the level of 
economic growth and welfare in all countries.  
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Table 1:  Key statistics for three sub-periods 
Labour productivity 




worked* GNP / 
Employment
GNP /  
Hours 
worked 




% of total 
population 
  Annual average growth rates     
1961-1973  4.2%  0.1%  n. a.  4.1%  n. a.  0.1%  1961 23.9% 
1973-1988  3.3%  0.1%  n. a.  3.2%  n. a.  0.9%  1976 25.6% 
1988-2003  5.7%  3.6%  -1.0%  2.0%  3.1%  0.8%  2003 41.1% 
 
*Average economy-wide hours worked declined from 43.1 a week in 1988 to 37.3 in 2003 – roughly one per 
cent a year. Some of the fall in hours – perhaps one hour a week – reflects the change of survey methodology 
in 1997.  Data for earlier periods are unavailable. 
Table 2:  Contribution to employment growth by gender and part-
time/full-time, 1988-2003 
                                            Per cent 
Men     
  Full-time  36.6 
  Part-time  6.1 
Women     
  Full-time  32.0 
  Part-time  25.3 
Total  100 
Note: Average hours worked per week by the employed labour force fell from 43.1 
in 1988 to 37.3 in 2003. 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey 
 
Table 3:  Schedule of “Activation Measures” under the  






18 – 19 year olds (pilot)  Six months  Oct 1996 
Under 25 years  Six months  Sept 1998 
25-34 years  Twelve months  May 1999 
Nine months  July 2000 
35-54 years  Twelve months  Feb 2000 
Nine months  July 2000 